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STATE OF UTAH, 
by and through its counsel, 
THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
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LIST OF PARTIES 
The only parties to this litigation are contained in 
the caption of the case including Patrick J. Hackford, 
and the State of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court applied the correct rule in 
disallowing prosecution witness cross-examination on prior 
mi sconduct. 
2. Whether the district court improperly instructed the 
jury on question of habitual criminal charge. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about 27 and 29 April, 1984, the defendant/appellant 
(hereinafter referred to as the "appellant") and a cohort, Joe 
Lane, proceeded to the Gulf Oil storage warehouse in Duchesne 
County, Utah in the wee hours of the day. They left the premises 
accompanied by numerous drill bits and tires all of which 
belonged to Gulf Oil and all of which were stolen by Joe and the 
appellant. Shortly thereafter, the bits, valued at about 
$2000.00 were sold to Harold J. Edelman of Carson City, Nevada. 
The tires were disposed of to various individuals in the 
Duchesne County area. 
A trial by jury was held on the 20th of March 1985 in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, Utah 
with the Honorable Richard C. Davidson presiding. 
Joe Lane was a key witness against his accomplice, Mr. 
Hackford. Appellant was unable to question the witness against 
his specific instances of misconduct for which the witness had 
admitted he was in jail. The court would only allow the 
appellant to ask if the witness had been convicted of a felony. 
(Refer to addendum p4, 75 through 83, and 137 of trial 
transcript . ) 
Mr. Hackford was charged with two counts of burglary, two 
counts of theft, and one count of being a habitual criminal. 
The jury found him guilty of two counts of theft, acquitted 
him in the burglary charges, and thereafter found him guilty of 
the charge, being a Habitual Criminal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was originally commenced in January of 1985 by 
the County of Duchesne against the defendant by informations 
charging the defendant with two counts of burglary, two counts 
of theft and one count of Being a Habitual Criminal, 
The matter was tried with a jury on 20 March 1985 in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County. The jury 
convicted the defendant of two counts of theft, acquitted him of 
two counts of Burglary and convicted him of one count of Being 
an Habitual Criminal. The court ruled against the defendant 's 
motion to dismiss and against the defendantfs exceptions to the 
instruct ions. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Argument No. 1: The court improperly disallowed the defendant 
to cross-examine Mr. Lane regarding his character or motivation 
for testifying against Mr. Hackford, and therefore the jury was 
unable to properly assess the credibility of the witness, Joe 
Lane. The specific questions revolved around charges against 
Mr. Lane for bad checks which the court disallowed improperly. 
This was in clear violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 
608(b), (c) and 405(a). 
Argument No. 2: The court improperly instructed the jury on the 
charge, Habitual Criminal by failing to tell the jury that the 
crime was a first degree felony and what the mandatory penalties 
flowing from a conviction could be and by stating that a prior 
suspended prison sentence could form the basis for a prior 
"commitment". 
ARGUMENT NO. 1 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY DISALLOWING THE DEFENDANT 
TO IMPEACH THE PROSECUTION WITNESS BY ASKING QUESTIONS 
INVOLVING SPECIFIC ACTS OF MISCONDUCT 
Rule 608 (b) and (c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence which 
were adopted 13 April 1983, effective 1 September 1983, provide 
that specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose 
of attaching his credibility other than conviction of a crime as 
provided in Rule 609 may not be proved extrinsic evidence. 
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However, the Rule does provide that, in the discretion of the 
court if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on a cross-examination of a witness concerning his 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The lower court 
made a fatal mistake by disallowing the Defendant, on 
cross-examination of co-accomplice, Joe Lane, the key 
Prosecutor's witness, to inquire about charged misconduct on 
behalf of Mr. Lane. Both Prosecutor and the court, (Tr. 79) 
relied on a clear mis-statement of the law to support the 
disallowance of questions regarding specific: misconduct. (See 
also Tr. 82.) 
The court, in its opening instruction No. 3, to the Jury 
said , 
"In determining the credibility of the 
witness you may consider any matter to prove or 
disprove his truthfulness, including the 
following: His desmeanor and manner while 
testifying. His capacity and opportunity to 
perceive or to recollect or to communicate. His 
character or honesty, veracity, a bias, interest, 
or any other motive. A statement previously made 
by him that is consistent or inconsistent with 
his testimony." 
(Tr.4) yet at the crucial time in the trial where the Defendant 
had the opportunity to enquire as to the character or honesty or 
other motives of the key witness against him, the court negated 
the Juryfs opportunity to follow his instruct:ions. 
Moreover, when opening Jury instruction No. 3 is read in 
conjunction with Utah Rules of Evidence 405, it is clear that 
the Defendant had little opportunity to impeach the witness 
according to law. Utah Rules of Evidence 405(a) states that: 
"In all cases in which evidence of character or a 
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trait of character of a person is admissi1e, 
proof may be made by testimony as to reputation 
or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On 
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It should be kept in mind that Mr. Lane was the accomplice 
of Mr. Hackford and as such' the Jury has a right to know 
something about the character of the Prosecutor's key witness. 
Yet the Prosecutor clearly mis-stated the law when he stated to 
the court that the prosecution witness could only be asked if 
"he was convicted of a felony. That is the extent the criminal 
record can be used to impeach the testimony of a witness." (Tr. 
77.) Mr. Lane had been in fact charged by the City of Roosevelt 
with writing bad checks and had been incarcerated pending 
disposition from New Year's Eve 1984 through January 10, 1985 
for those charges. Yet, the court (Tr. 78) gave the Defendant a 
"choice." "If you want to examine him (Mr. Lane), his record, 
bring his rap sheet and make it a matter of record we will do 
the same for Mr. Hackford." 
The court then mis-stated the law (Tr.78) by saying, "I'm 
not going to allow you to delve into this individual's prior 
record or subsequent record or any other reports other than the 
fact you can question whether or not he has been convicted of a 
felony. That's the appropriate question to ask a witness." 
As a result, the Defendant lost his opportunity for a more 
favorable result, and was thusly seriously prejudiced. State v 
Cornish , Utah, 580 P2d 606 (1978). 
-6-
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ARGUMENT NO. 2 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE CHARGE FOR A HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL BY FAILING TO TELL THE JURY 
THAT THE CRIME WAS A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY AND WHAT THE MANDATORY PENALTIES 
FLOWING FROM A CONVICTION COULD BE AND 
BY STATING THAT A PRIOR SUSPENDED 
PRISON SENTENCE COULD FORM THE BASIS 
FOR A PRIOR "COMMITMENT". 
Patrick Hackford was sentenced on September 14, 1977 in 
Case No. 817 in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Duchesne 
County. Part of that sentence was a sentence to the Utah State 
Prison from 0 - 5 years. However, execution of the sentence was 
suspended and Defendant was placed on probation for three 
years, provided he fill certain conditions and terms, including 
serving a six-month jail sentence in the Duchesne County Jail, 
which he completed. 
Thereafter, on October 27, 1980, in case No. 944, the same 
court, for an unrelated charge pronounced judgment which 
included confinement at a Utah State Prison for 1 - 15 years. 
Pertinent language of the judgment reads: 
"In case No. 944 the sentence imposed by Judge 
Sorenson on September 14, 1977 (Case No. 817) 
Confinement in a Utah State Prison for a term not 
to exceed 5 years be executed. The two sentences 
will run concurrently." 
In error, the lower court herein used their judgment to 
form the basis for the requisite two prior commitments. 
Accordingly, the court erred in its instruction No. 2 to 
the jury (TR. 192) by saying: 
"You are instructed that the word "committed" 
means the order by which a person is sent to 
prison. You are further instructed that each 
time a person is ordered sent to prison in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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carrying out a sentence, that person is being 
committed. It is irrelevant whether multiple 
commitments are to be served concurrently, that 
is, at the same time, or consecutively, that is 
separately . " 
It is the position of the Defendant that the sentence 
pronounced in Case No. 817 was merged into Case No. 944 and 
therefore the requirements of Utah Code Annotated 76-8-1001 
which requires two separate sentences and commitments to prison 
were not met in this case. The Defendant excepted the court's 
instruction (Tr. 193, 194). 
Secondly, the jury was not apprised that the crime was a 
first degree felony which carried with it a mandatory 5 to life 
prison sentence. (Tr. 191 through 194). 
The State relied upon State of Utah vs. Montague 671 P2d 
187 (1983) for authority to base its position. However, 
Montague is inapposite to the case at Bar. Montague had 
actually served time on both prior sentences whereas Hackford 
served time on one. And, Montague, unlike Hackford, had both 
prior sentences run consecutively. Hackford had his first 
sentence (817) suspended , then merged into the later case 
(944). 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred to the substantiated predjudice of 
the Defendant by 1. Not allowing cross-examination into the 
charged mis-conduct of Presecution's key witness and 2. By 
giving improper instructions defining a prior "commitment" and 
by not informing the jury of the mandatory prison sentence 
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associated therewith. 
As a result, the jury could not get a clear idea of the 
character and motives for the testimony of the co-accomplice 
witness. 
Moreover, the jury were mis-informed as to the legal nature 
of the Being Habitual Criminal Charge. 
The net effect was to fatally impair the Defendant's 
rights. 
For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully submits that 
the decision of the lower court be reversed and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
£ 
A n t h o n y/J// F a m u 1 a r y 
Attorney Tor the Defen*rfant /Appellant 
-9-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
PATRICK HACKFORD 
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 8l*J 
DATE: September l ' i , 1977 
JUDGE: DAVID SAM 
COURT REPORTER: RICHARD TAT ION 
Defendant 
This matter was before the court for pronouncement of judgment with Dennis L. 
Draney, Duchesne County Attorney, appearing for the State. The defendant was pre-
sent and represented by James R. Hall. Counsel for defendant addressed the court 
in the defendant's behalf. Defendant addressed the court in his own behalf. 
The matter was convened to Chambers for conference with counsel and interested 
parties. 
The matter was again before the court for pronouncement of judgment. There being 
no legal reason why judgment should not be pronounced at this time it is the 
Judgment of the court that defendant be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate period of time not to exceed five (5) years. Execution_of sen-
tence ij^sjis^tided and defendant placed on probation for a period of three~T3) years 
on the following terms and conditions: 
(_1. That he serve six months in the nn~i ~ " _^.* 
2. That he enter into an agr- ——-
Parole Department &V* 
3. That he be ava^ 
requested 4 
l i .
 T h a t t . , : . i , 
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IN TIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,. £ " , ' L E D 
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h
c
e
o
D
'fr,c ,C^JDucheStlo 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH ' y " S , a , e of Ulal) 
\NOV i o mo 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY ' 
• ' im3l£?m"' Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs, 
rEXCKJIA£KEQED_ 
Plaintiff 
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 817 and 944 
DATE: October 27, 1980 
JUDGE: J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
COURT REPORTER: EDWARD V. QUIST 
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT 
These matters were before the court for termination of probation 
case No. 817 and pronouncement of judgment in case No. 944. The 
ate was represented by Dennis L. Draney. The defendant was present 
1 represented by Ronald Yengitch. Counsel for defendant represents 
the court that defendant admits the allegations in case #817 and in 
se #944 waives the pre-sentence report and reauest-s
 Rpnf-cmrW«r* ~»-
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WISH.TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT!M 
: Q ', NEXT SENTENCE. 
A "ROGER SMITH CAME TO ME AND ASKED ME TO GET RID OF 
SOME HOT BITS FOR HIM." 
! Q FOR WHAT REASON? , 
A FOR THE SUM OF MONEY. 
Q THAT'S ON THE STATEMENT IN YOUR HANDWRITING, ISN'T 
IT? • :/ •}• 
A .•' YES.": ' .: '.'.. ' • • • / ' 
MR. FAMULARYt OFFER TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 
12, YOUR HONOR. , ;. 
' ,MR. DRANEYI WE HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
. ' THE COURT!•' IT'S RECEIVED* '" ' 
' • . / » • • ? . . . - . • • • 
MR. 'FAMULARYl CAN I GIVE IT TO THE JURY? 
•
:
 MR. DRANEYl NOT NOW. 
V . MR. FAMULARYl NOT YET? 
,i •" ;• • THE COURT* NO.f .".- i -; 
';.-; : Q -•'";.; (BY MR. FAMULARY) NOW, LET'S TALK ABOUT THIS DEAL 
YOU EITHER DID OR DIDN'T MAKE WITH THE COUNTY OF DUCHESNE 
' REGARDING YOUR TESTIMONY. YOU JUST TESTIFIED THAT YOU MADE 
NO AGREEMENT WITH THE STATE? 
A > THAT'S A,FACT. i'^  
Q .FOR YOUR TESTIMONY TODAY; IS THAT TRUE? 
A .THAT'S A FACT. ';f » : 
> . i" - . * • ' • . ' . ' ' ' '' - ' • • • • " . 
Q t YET YOU ADMITTED TO BURGLARIZING OR AT LEAST THEFT 
-75-
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< 
— P A R T I C I P A T I N G IN A:THEFT AT LEAST TWICE, DIDN'T YOU? 
A
 r Y E S . •:•.:;•••'-''''"' ' ' ''-; V ; • ' ' • / ' ' • ' ' . ^ 
•:'.... Q AND STEALING ALL THOSE GOODS YOU STOLE FROM THE 
.GULF OIL? •'.-t-;'"':V:••';'/. :'v ';.(- • .. , ' • 
A YES. • ''^yi''"'-' •• , •<!';•• '"' '"• ••''••'' 
' Q YET YOU WERE ONLY CHARGED ONE TIME, RIGHT? ONE 
; T H E F T ? ' ,•;'•••)' ".'., ' , '"'y- '.. •.. ' 
' - A Y E S . ' •••"'.'''
 ; ;' 
Q - W H A T HAPPENED ON ALL THE BAD CHECK CHARGES YOU FIAI 
PRIOR TO THAT? ' . / ; , ; ; , v 
i ;••'.' MR. DRANEYt, I OBJECT TO THAT. IT'S TOTALLY 
IRRELEVANT, YOUR HONOR,: AND COUNSEL KNOWS THAT THAT IS 
OBJECTIONABLE AT THIS' TYPE OF A HEARING. 
THE COURT t APPROACH THE BENCH. 
(WHEREUPON AN OFF-THE-RECORD DISCUSSION WAS 
•i HELD AT THE BENCH.) I 
THE COURT! LADIES AND GENTLEMEN LET'S TAKE A 
.FIFTEEN-MINUTE RECESS. BE BACK IN YOUR SEATS IN FIFTEEN 
MINUTES. SAME ADMONITION DOES APPLY. DO NOT DISCUSS THE 
CASE AMONG YOURSELVES OR WITH ANYBODY ELSE WHILE YOU ARE OUT 
OF HERE. •'•'•:•'-'" ,:V,'' '••':.•. 
' (WHEREUPON THE JURY WAS EXCUSED.) 
. THE.COURT» DO YOU WANT YOUR CLIENT PRESENT? 
THE RECORD WILL INDICATE WE HAVE SENT THE JURY OUT. WE 
ARE STILL IN THE COURTROOM, BUT THE JURY IS NOT PRESENT. 
-7f>-
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1 THERE'S BEEN AN OBJECTION RAISED BY THE STATE. DO YOU 
2 ; WISH TO RESTATE THAT OBJECTION ON THE RECORD? 
3 ; MR. DRANEYJ THAT OBJECTION IS THAT THE PRESENCE 
4 OF ANY CHARGES OR CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS OR CRIMINAL 
5 ACTIVITIES IS IRRELEVANT;AND INADMISSIBLE AGAINST THIS 
6 WITNESS, EXCEPT THAT HE CAN BE ASKED IF HE HAS BEEN 
7 CONVICTED OF A FELONY. THAT'S THE EXTENT THAT THE CRIMINAL 
8 RECORD CAN BE USED TO IMPEACH THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS. 
9 , THE COURT: MR. FAMULARY? 
10 ; MR. FAMULARY! YOUR HONOR, THIS FIRST OF ALL THE 
11 BAD CHECK WRITING, OF COURSE, IS A CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE 
12 OR ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE AND THEREFORE SHOULP 
13 BE ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH. THE MAIN REASON I'M BRINGING THIS 
14 WHOLE QUESTION UP IS THAT MR. LANE HAS HAD WITHIN THE LAST 
15 THREE OR FOUR MONTHS A NUMBER OF CHARGES THAT -WERE BROUGHT 
16 UP AGAINST HIM BY DUCHESNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, AMD 
17 HE HAS TESTIFIED THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY DEALS MADE, NO 
18 AGREEMENTS MADE, NO CONSIDERATION AT ALL GIVEN TO HIM FOR 
19 TESTIFYING TODAY, WHICH WE KNOW TO BE A COMPLETE-
20 FABRICATION. HE HAS HAD BAD CHECK CHARGES. IN FACT, HE HA5 
21 BEEN IN J A I L — I T ' S ALREADY ADMITTED IN JAIL FROM NEW YEAR'S 
22 EVE TO THE 10TH OF JANUARY. 
23 WE HAVE WITNESSES THAT CAN TELL WHAT HE WAS IN JAIL 
24 FOR, AND THEY.WERE BAD CHECK CHARGES INVOLVED IN JANUARY. 
25 PART OF THIS WHOLE DEAL, ALL THIS CONVERSATION AND THE 
- 7 7 -
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1, ARRANGEMENTS HE HAD MADE WITH THE COUNTY IS IN FACT TO 
2 IMPEACH HIS TESTIMONY. IT ALSO GOES TO SHOW BIAS AND MOTIVF 
3 AND SO FORTH FOR TESTIFYING HERE TODAY. 
4 ^ 'THE COURT: . I WILL GIVE YOU A CHOICE. IF YOU WAN! 
5 TO EXAMINE HIM, HIS RECORD, BRING HIS RAP SHEET AND MAKE IT 
6 A MATTER OF RECORD WE WILL DO THE SAME FOR MR. HACKFORD. 
7 MR. FAMULARYl WELL, THAT WOULD BE IMPROPER. 
8 THE COURTt ABSOLUTELY. 
9 MR. FAMULARYl WE ARE.NOT OPENING THE DOOR FOR OUP 
10 DEFENDANT. HE'S GOT A LOT MORE RIGHTS AS A WITNESS. IN 
11 THIS CASE TALKING ABOUT AGREEMENTS REACHED THE JURY NEEDS TO 
12 KNOW WHY HE IS TESTIFYING TODAY OR AT LEAST POSSIBLE 
13 MOTIVES. THE BAD CHECK CHARGES WERE ALL OF THAT DEAL. 
14 THE COURTl I'M NOT GOING TO ALLOW YOU TO DELVE 
\i5 INTO THIS INDIVIDUAL'S PRIOR RECORD OR SUBSEQUENT RECORD OR 
L ANY OTHER REPORTS OTHER THAN THE FACT YOU CAN QUESTION 
l\ WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A FELONY. THAT'S 
l8l THE APPROPRIATE QUESTION TO ASK A WITNESS. 
MR. FAMULARYl WELL, YOUR HONOR, HERE A G A I N — 
THE COURTl, THE JURY IS VERY MUCH AWARE HE'S 
2i II ALREADY PLED GUITY. HE IS AT THE ST. MARK'S DIAGNOSTIC 
22 CENTER. THE JURY KNOWS ABOUT THAT, BUT TO GO INTO BAD CHECK 
23 . CHARGES THAT WEREN'T B R O U G H T — 
24 \\ MR. FAMULARYl THE CHARGES WERE BROUGHT. 
25 THE COURTl IT'S TOTALLY IMPROPER AND YOU KNOW 
19 
20 
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1 THAT. 
2 ' MR. FAMULARYl YOUR HONOR, IF I THOUGHT IT WAS 
3 IMPROPER I WOULDN'T HAVE DONE IT. MY POINT IS WE HAVE TO 
4 OFFER THIS AS REBUTTAL AT THIS POINT. HE IS SAYING NO 
5 PROMISE WAS MADE. HE'S TESTIFIED UNDER OATH, WHEN IN FACT 
6
 ; THERE WAS PROMISES MADE AND IT INVOLVES OTHER CHARGES. 
7 THERE'S TWO SIDES TO THIS STORY. 
8 MR. DRANEY: YOUR HONOR, THE LAW IS VERY CLEAR, 
9 | AND THAT IS ANY-EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL RECORD OR CRIMINAL 
l^ JI 1 1 ACTIVITY CAN BE INQUIRED INTO TO THIS EXTENT. HAVE YOU 
I I EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF A FELONY, YES OR NO. THAT'S THE 
12 \ Y x T E N T OF IT ALLOWED UNDER OUR RULES. 
13 THE COURTI 'IT'S THE EXTENT TO THE FIRST QUESTION. 
14 IF HE ANSWERS NO WHEN IN FACT THE ANSWER IS YES THEN WHOEVEP 
15 ASKS IT IS THEN ALLOWED TO BRING IN EVIDENCE OF P R I O R — 
16 . ' MR. DRANEY: BRING IN EVIDENCE, BUT HE CAN'T ASK 
17 THE WITNESS ANY MORE ABOUT IT. 
18 ,/ THE COURTt THAT'S CORRECT, AND IF HE. ANSWERS YES, 
19 WfTHAT'S IT. THAT'S THE RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
20 MR. FAMULARYl HE HASN'T ANSWERED IT. 
21 THE COURTt THE QUESTION YOU ASKED IF HOW ABOUT 
22 THESE BAD CHECK CHARGES, AND THAT GOES WAY BEYOND. I'M NOT 
23 GOING TO ALLOW IT. 
24 MR* FAMULARYl OKAY. THEN WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO 
25 INQUIRE FROM M R . — W E FEEL HE ALREADY OPENED THE DOOR FOR THF. 
-79-
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9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
' 17 ! 
18 
19 
- 20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
;
 25 
SIMPLE REASON HE SAID HE WAS IN JAIL FROM NEW YEARfS EVEN TP 
THE 10TH OF JANUARY, IT WOULDNfT BE IMPROPER TO ASK WHY HE 
WAS IN JAIL, BECAUSE THE DOOR HAS ALREADY BEEN OPENED. 
' THE COURTl WHY HE WAS IN JAIL AT THAT POINT IN ! 
TIME I'M NOT GOING TO ALLOW YOU TO GET INTO. 
MR. FAMULARYt HOW FAR WILL THE COURT LET US GO? 
THE COURT! I WOULD ALLOW "HAVE YOU BEEN CONVICTFD 
OF A FELONY?" 
IF HE SAYS, YES, THAT'S IT. 
I WILL, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER OF RECORD 
BEFORE THIS JURY, ALLOW YOU TO GO IN TO WHAT HE IS OUT AT 
ST. MARK'S FOR. THE FACT THAT HE WAS INVOLVED WITH MR. 
HACKFORD, IF THE JURY BELIEVES THAT. YOU CAN GO INTO ANY Of 
THAT YOU WANT TO. AS FAR AS GOING INTO ANY OTHER CHARGES 
OTHER THAN THE FACT HAVE YOU BEEN CONVICTED OF A FELONY, IF 
HE ANSWERS THAT YES, NO MORE. 
MR. FAMULARYt OKAY. BUT THERE ARE, YOUR HONOR, 
SOME OTHER MATTERS WHICH WILL NEED TO BE BROUGHT UP IN THIS 
AGREEMENT THAT WAS REACHED WHICH WE NEED TO GO INTO REBUTTAT 
OR ON CROSS-EXAMINATION. HE SAID THERE WASN'T AN AGREEMENT 
REACHED. 
THE COURTi WELL— 
, ; MR. FAMULARYt CAN I QUESTION ABOUT OTHER CHARGES 
WITHOUT BEING SPECIFIC AS PART OF THIS AGREEMENT? 
THE COURTt MR. DRANEY? 
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1 II , MR. DRANEYt YOUR HONOR, THE LEGISLATURE AND THE 
2 COURTS OVER THE YEARS HAVE DETERMINED, AND WISELY SO, THAT I 
3 THERE WILL BE A LIMIT ON THE INQUIRY INTO THE CRIMINAL 
4 RECORD OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF A WITNESS. THE QUESTION OF 
5 WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANY KIND OF AN AGREEMENT MADE CAN BE 
6 APPROACHED WITHOUT INQUIRING INTO THAT, AND WE SUBMIT THAT 
7 THE CONCERNS THAT COUNSEL HAS OVER WHETHER OR NOT AN AGREE-
8 MENT WAS REACHED CAN BE APPROACHED WITHOUT GOING INTO THE 
9 RECORD, IF ANY, OF THIS WITNESS. 
10 THE COURT: HOW DO YOU SUGGEST HE DO THAT? 
1' MR. DRANEYt I THINK THAT HE IS STUCK WITH THE 
12 ANSWER THAT THIS WITNESS HAS GIVEN HIM, UNLESS HE CAN BRING 
13 \ SOMETHING ELSE IN. HE CAN'T STAND THERE AND ASK THIS 
14
 \\ WITNESS ABOUT HIS CRIMINAL BACKGROUND WITH AN ATTEMPT TO 
15 W M P E A C H . HE CAN'T DO THAT WITH THIS WITNESS. 
'6 MR. FAMULARY: HIS STATEMENT GOES NOT ONLY TO 
17 IMPEACH THE WITNESS. WE ARE NOT HERE JUST TO IMPEACH THE 
18 WITNESS. THAT STATEMENT IS CORRECT AS FAR AS THE LAW IS 
19 CONCERNED ABOUT IMPEACHING THE WITNESS. WHAT WE ARE TALKIFK 
20 ABOUT HERE IS TO THE AGREEMENT THAT WAS REACHED. 
21 . MR. DRANEYt YOUR H O N O R — 
22 THE COURT: THAT'S IMPEACHMENT. 
23 , MR. DRANEYt THAT'S IMPEACHMENT, BECAUSE HE HAS 
24 ALREADY ANSWERED THAT QUESTION. HE HAS SAID NO. WE WILL 
25 HAVE THE TESTIMONY FROM MR. FOOTE AS TO WHAT HAPPENED, AND 
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THAT CAN BE APPROACHED IN THAT REGARD. MR. LANE HAS 
ANSWERED THE QUESTION AND I BELIEVE COUNSEL IS STUCK WITH. 
THAT ANSWER UNLESS HE HAS SOMETHING ELSE. 
••'»... MR* FAMULARY: I CAN GO INTO IT WITHOUT SPECIFIC 
MISCONDUCT, BUT AS FAR AS MR. FOOTE, HE HAS ALREADY BEEN 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY THE PROSECUTION. I BELIEVE THE RULE 
WON'T PERMIT ME TO BRING--UNLESS THE COURT FOR SOME GOOD 
REASON DIRECTS OTHERWISE. 
THE COURT: WELL, THE COURT FOR ANY GOOD REASON 
FOR THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE IS GOING TO ALLOW YOU FELLOWS T( 
CALL AS MANY WITNESSES AS YOU WANT. 
BUT THE RULING I'M MAKING AT THIS POINT IS THIS. YOU 
CANNOT GO INTO ANY CONVICTIONS OTHER THAN WHAT'S ALREADY 
BEEN OPENED UP, AND THAT'S THIS CONVICTION NOW, BECAUSE THAI 
DOOR HAS BEEN OPENED. I WILL ALLOW YOU TO QUESTION HIM AS 
TO WHAT HE IS IN THERE FOR AND WHAT HE IS LOOKING AT AND 
THAT KIND OF THING. 
MR. FAMULARY: WHY HE IS JAIL AND SO FORTH? 
THE COURTl NOT IF IT'S OUTSIDE THIS CHARGE. 
MR. FAMULARY: HE HAS ALREADY TESTIFIED, YOUR | 
I 
HONOR, THAT HE IS IN JAIL. j 
THE COURT: HE HAS ALREADY TESTIFIED HE WAS IN 
JAIL. THE JURY HAS A RIGHT TO SURMISE IF THEY CHOSE THAT HF. 
WAS IN THERE FOR THIS CHARGE. I'M NOT GOING TO ALLOW YOU TO 
QUESTION ABOUT OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS CRIMINAL CAREER, IF HE 
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HAS GOT ONE. 
MR. FAMULARYJ WE DON'T INTEND TO, BUT WE ARE ! 
LOOKING AT THIS CRIMINAL TIME PERIOD FROM JANUARY 1ST, AT 
LEAST NEW YEAR'S EVE, UNTIL THE TIME HE HAD THIS STATEMENT 
TO OFFICER FOOTE ON TAPE OF JANUARY 22ND. A LOT OF THINGS 
HAPPENED IN THAT TIME FRAME THAT WILL SHOW THAT THERE WAS AN| 
AGREEMENT REACHED. IN FACT, OFFICER FOOTE WILL PROFFER 
EVIDENCE. HE WILL ACTUALLY TELL YOU. 
THE COURT! I'M NOT GOING TO ALLOW YOU TO QUESTION 
HIM. THAT'S MY RULING. > , : 
I'M TAKING A^FIVE-MINUTE BREAK. 
7 (A BRIEF RECESS WAS TAKEN.) 
THE COURTi THE',RECORD WILL INDICATE THE JURY IS 
BACK, COUNSEL AND THE DEFENDANT ARE ALSO PRESENT. YOU MAY 
PROCEED. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) 
BY MR. FAMULARYl 
Q NOW, DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO BE UNDER OATH, 
.MR. LANE? , V 
A YES, SIR. 
Q WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO YOU? 
A IT MEANS THAT IF YOU DON'T TELL THE TRUTH YOU CAN 
GO TO JAIL. 
Q NOW, HAVE YOU MADE AMY DEALB WITH THE COUNTY 0? 
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1 II MR. DRANEY: NO. 
2 THE COURTl YOU MAY STEP DOWN. 
j i t 
3 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, LET ME CLEAR UP ONE POINT. NO 
4 DEAL AS IT-HAS BEEN TALKED AROUND HERE WITH ANY CRIMINAL j 
5 DEFENDANT CAN BE MADE WHICH BINDS THIS JUDGE OR ANY OTHER i 
6 JUDGE IN ANY WAY. SO ANY DEAL THAT ANYBODY IS TALKING APOl 
7 DOES NOT INVOLVE THIS COURT. IT CANNOT BECAUSE THIS COURT 
8 DOES NOT WORK BEHIND CLOSED DOORS. THIS COURT WORKS ON THA 
9 RECORD. I WANT THAT TO BE VERY CLEAR IN YOUR MINDS. I 
10 SECOND OF ALL,, THE PERSON ON TRIAL HERE IS THE 
11 .  DEFENDANT. IT'S HIS GUILT OR INNOCENCE THAT YOU ARE CHARGE 
1.2 TO DETERMINE. NOBODY ELSE'S. 
13 CALL YOUR NEXT, WITNESS. : . 
14 •• MR. DRANEYt MAY I HAVE JUST A MOMENT? 
15 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
16 MR. DRANEY: I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL MR. FOOTE, 
17 PLEASE., ' ; ' 
18 
19 . '",":" JERRY FOOTE, -
20 RECALLED AS WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, HAVING 
21 •• ' PREVIOUSLY BEEN DULY SWORN, WAS FURTHER EXAMINED AND 
22 TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
23 
24 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
25 BY MR. DRANEYl 
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JUROR NO. 4: YES. 
2 II THE COURTt THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
3 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE WEREN'T ALLOWED TO TELL YOU 
4 THERE IS ANOTHER CHARGE PENDING WHICH REQUIRES BY LAW THAT 
5 YOU TRY THAT ONE. THAT'S TO BE TRIED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING 
6 THIS ONE, IF YOU FOUND HIM GUILTY OF EITHER OF THESE TWO 
7 THEFTS. THEY ARE BOTH SECOND DEGREE FELONIES. 
8 I WOULD LIKE TO GO HOME, TOO, BELIEVE ME. I KNOW THAT 
9 YOU FOLKS WOULD, TOO. 
,0 THIS CHARGE IS ONE OF BEING A HABITUAL CRIMINAL, AND II 
11 HAS CERTAIN ELEMENTS THAT HAVE TO BE PROVEN. THE ELEMENTS 
12 ARE VERY SIMPLE, AND I SUSPECT THAT THE PROOF ON THIS WILL 
13 BE OFFERED THROUGH DOCUMENTS, PROBABLY WITH NO WITNESSES. 
H WE WILL PROCEED WITH THAT. I DON'T THINK IT WILL TAKE vrnv 
15 LONG, BUT NONETHELESS WE HAVE TO DO IT BY LAW. I APOLOGIZE 
16 TO YOU FOR HAVING TO MISLEAD YOU, BUT THE LAW WOULDN'T ALL'.:'-: 
17 ME TO MENTION TO YOU WHAT'S GOING ON, BECAUSE IF YOU DID yon 
18 MIGHT HAVE FEELINGS INVOLVED AND FOR THAT REASON IT HAS TO 
19 BE DONE THIS WAY. 
20 ARE YOU READY TO PROCEED ON 8 5 - C R - 2 6 ? 
2i MR. DRANEYs THE STATE I S . 
22 MR. FAMULARY: I THINK, YOUR HONOR, THAT WE MAY 
23 WANT TO CONDUCT—HAVE A COUPLE PRELIMINARY ISSUES TO 
24 DISCUSS, MAYBE DO THIS OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY. I 
25 HAVEN'T SEEN ALL THE STUFF THAT'S BEEN PRESENTED. 
•inr. 
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1 THE COURT: CAN'T PRESENT ANYMORE THAN YOU HAVF 
2 SEEN. ' 
3 I MR. DRANEYJ NOPE. ' | 
4 THE COURTt YOU HAVE SEEN IT. ARE YOU READY TO i 
5 PROCEED? 
6 MR. FAMULARYt I STILL NEED TO REVIEW WHAT HE IS 
7 PRESENTING TONIGHT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE IS GOING TO 
8 PRESENT TONIGHT. 
9 THE COURTt DO YOU HAVE COPIES TO GIVE TO HIM? 
10 MR. DRANEYt HE HAS COPIES. WE DELIVERED COPIES 
11 ON MONDAY. I DON'T HAVE OTHER COPIES RIGHT NOW. 
12 MR. FAMULARYt LET ME SEE WHAT YOU HAVE GOT THEP.E. 
13 THE COURT! THERE IS THE TWO COPIES PRESENTED 
H MONDAY. 
I 
15 LET'S TAKE A QUICK TEN-MINUTE RECESS, LADIES AND 
16 GENTLEMEN AND COME BACK IN AND I SUSPECT WE WILL BE OUT OF 
17 HERE VERY QUICKLY. 
18 (WHEREUPON THE JURY WAS EXCUSED.) 
19 THE COURTt THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THE JURY T' 
II s 
20 NOT HERE, BUT PRESENT IS THE DEFENDANT, AS WELL AS BOTH 
21 COUNSEL. 
22 MR. FAMULARYt OUR MOTION IS TO EXCLUDE THIS 
23 II PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION 
24 || RELATING TO CIVIL NO. 817 AND 944, AS WELL AS THE TRANSCRin 
25 || WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY THIS, BASED ON THE FACT THAT WE DON'T 
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ANTICIPATE ANY FOUNDATION BEING LAID FOR IT, AND THERE'S NO 
2 II CERTIFICATION THAT I CAN SEE THIS IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY 
3 OF THE ORIGINAL. AT LEAST ON THE COPY I HAVE, 
4 MR. DRANEYt LOOK ON THE BACK. 
5 THE COURTt TURN IT OVER. 
6 MR. FAMULARYt BASIC ARGUMENT IS THAT IT'S 
7 HEARSAY. 
8 THE COURTt 8036 SPELLS IT OUT. 
9 MR FAMULARYt OUR OTHER OBJECTION IS ALREADY NOTED 
10 IN OUR BRIEF WHICH WAS FILED MONDAY, OR I FILED LAST WEEK 
11 AND ARGUED THIS PAST MONDAY, AND WE WILL INCORPORATE THOSE 
12 ARGUMENTS HERE FOR THE RECORD TODAY. 
13 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY REINCORPORATE 
14 THEM. 
15 YOUR MOTION IS DENIED. 
16 MR. FAMULARYt 'THANK YOU. 
17 THE COURTt ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED TO TAKE CARE OF? 
18 ARE YOU READY TO GO FORWARD WITH THE JURY COMING BACK? 
,9 MR. FAMULARYt I GUESS. HOW DO WE PROCEED ON 
20 THIS? PRESENT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE? 
21 MR. DRANEYt I'M GOING TO OFFER A VERY BRIEF 
22 OPENING STATEMENT. 
23 THE COURTt VERY BRIEF, PRESENT YOUR EVIDENCE AND 
24 REST? 
25 MR. DRANEYt THAT'S RIGHT. 
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MR. FAMULARY: THEN I ' L L HAVE THE CASE TO PRESENT, 
EXCEPT FOR ARGUMENT. DO YOU WANT THE ARGUMENT AFTER—HE CAM 
PROBABLY GIVE AN OPENING AND CLOSING? -
THE COURTl YOU ARE ENTITLED TO GIVE AN OPENING 
AND CLOSING YOURSELF. 
MR. FAMULARYS WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE. 
THE COURTI I DON'T WANT LEGAL ISSUES ARGUED TO 
THE JURY, AND THE ISSUE THAT YOU WANT TO RAISE I S A LEGAL 
ONE. .....
 : 
MR. FAMULARY* YOU ARE SAYING DIVIDE THE FACTUAL 
I S S U E S ? t';,. 
THE COURTS IF YOU HAVE ANY FACTUAL ISSUES. I'M 
NOT GOING TO ARGUE THE MEANING OF THE WORD COMMITMENT AND U 
SUSPENDED, BECAUSE THAT'S PURELY LEGAL AND I HAVE ALREADY 
RULED ON THOSE AND THAT RULING IS IN THE FILE AND I T ' S IN 
WRITING. YOU CAN TAKE THAT UP IN YOU CHOOSE. 
MR. FAMULARY: OKAY. THAT'S ALL WE HAVE AT THIS 
TIME, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURTS OKAY. THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON THE JURY WAS RETURNED.) 
THE COURTS BE BACK ON THE RECORD. 
WE ARE NOT IN CASE NO. 8 5 - C R - 2 6 D , A NEW CASE. THE 
CHARGE IN THAT CASE BEING ONE OF BEING A HABITUAL CRIMINAL, 
A VIOLATION OF SECTION 7 6 - 8 1 - 0 0 1 . 
AS PROVIDED BY LAW THIS MATTER I S TO BE HEARD 
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IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE PRECEDING MATTERS IN WHICH THE 
DEFENDANT, MR. HACKFORD, WAS FOUND GUILTY BY,THIS SAME JURY 
OF TWO ADDITIONAL SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, THEREBY LAYING THE 
FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROCEEDING. 
ARE YOU READY TO PROCEED, MR. DRANEY? 
MR. DRANEYt THE STATE IS READY TO PROCEED. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU READY TO GO, MR. FAMULARY? 
MR. FAMULARY: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURTt OPENING STATEMENTS? 
MR. DRANEY: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE UNDERSTAND 
THAT WHICH YOU ARE FEELING NOW, HAVING BEEN THROUGH A TIME 
THAT IS NOT EASY EMOTIONALLY AND TO PHYSICALLY SIT HERE THIS 
MANY HOURS AND GO THROUGH IT. THE HEARING THAT WE WILL NOW 
GO THROUGH WILL BE BRIEF./ 
UTAH LAW PROVIDES THAT IF A DEFENDANT HAS BEEN TWICE 
CONVICTED AND SENTENCED AND COMMITTED FOR CRIMES, ONE OF 
WHICH IS AT LEAST A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND THEN IS ONCE 
AGAIN COMMITTED—ONCE AGAIN CONVICTED OF A SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, IN THIS STATE AN ADDITIONAL CHARGE CAN BE BROUGHT 
AGAINST HIM AND THAT IS CALLED BEING A HABITUAL CRIMINAL, 
AND THAT PROVIDES FOR AN ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT IF THE JURY 
FINDS THAT THESE THINGS HAVE OCCURRED. IT PROVIDES A WAY BY 
WHICH ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT CAN BE IMPOSED IF IT IS FOUND 
THAT THIS DEFENDANT HAS A CONTINUING PATTERN OF VIOLATION OF 
THE LAW. IT IS A RATHER SEVERE PENALTY ADDED TO SERIOUS 
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1 MATTERS ON WHICH THIS DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CONVICTED. THE 
( 
2 COURT WILL INSTRUCT YOU THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO 
3 FIND THAT ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS THIS DEFENDANT HAS BEEN 
4 CONVICTED OF FELONY CHARGES, THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE 
5 CONVICTIONS HE HAS BEEN SENTENCED, AND THAT UNDER THE 
6 SENTENCE HE HAS BEEN COMMITTED TO SERVE A TERM IN PRISON. 
7 THE EVIDENCE OF WHICH WE WILL SHOW YOU WILL BE VERY BRIEF. ! 
8 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOWING THE RECORD OF DEFENDANT IN THIP 
9 COURT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT YOU WILL FIND, BASED UPON THAT 
10 EVIDENCE, THAT THE STATE HAS MADE ITS BURDEN IN SHOWING THE 
11 ELEMENTS OF THIS CRIME, AND BASED THEREON WE WOULD ASK YOU 
12 TO FIND HIM GUILTY OF BEING A HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
13 THANK YOU. 
14 THE COURT: MR. FAMULARY? HAVE YOU PROFFERED THA'I 
15 EVIDENCE YET? 
16 MR. DRANEYJ IT HASN'T BEEN PROFFERED YET. ' 
17 MR. FAMULARY J I AM GOING TO JUST PUT MR. HACKFORI) 
18 ON THE STAND FOR A MINUTE OR TWO AND EXPLAIN WHAT THE NATUH' 
19 OF THE PREVIOUS THINGS RELIED ON BY THE PROSECUTION WERE AF.'I 
20 WHAT AGE HE WAS AT THAT TIME AND LET YOU DECIDE WHETHER OR 
21 NOT HE SHOULD BE BRANDED A HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
22 II THE COURT: PROCEED. 
23|| . MR. FAMULARY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
24 || THE COURT: BEFORE HE STARTS, LADIES AND 
25 || GENTLEMEN, WE ARE NOT GOING THROUGH A LOT OF FORMS LIKE It? 
-jns 
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THE FIRST TRIAL, BECAUSE YOU HAVE BEEN THERE. I'M NOT 
READING ALL THESE PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU. YOU KNOW 
WHAT THE RULES ARE NOW. I'M NOT GOING TO READ A LOT OF 
CLOSING INSTRUCTIONS, EITHER, BECAUSE YOU KNOW THEM. SO 
THIS IS AN ABBREVIATED HEARING, AND THE PURPOSE OF IT BEING 
THE SAME FOLKS HERE THIS TO MAKE IT ABBREVIATED. PROCEED. 
MR. DRANEYl WE PROFFER EXHIBIT NO. 1, YOUR HONOR, 
WHICH IS A MINUTE ENTRY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. THAT, AS THE COURT KNOWS, AND 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY, THIS COURT IS NOW THE 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. THAT WAS CHANGED IN 1904. 
PRIOR TO THAT TIME IT WAS THE FOURTH DISTRICT. SO WHEN THI!^ 
REFERS TO THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IT IS REFERRING TO THIS 
COURT THAT WAS SITTING HERE IN DUCHESNE COUNTY. THIS IS 
DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 1977. THIS MINUTE ENTRY INDICATES THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS BEFORE THE COURT FOR SENTENCING. IT SHOW? 
THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT WAS THAT THE DEFENDANT BE 
SENTENCED TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON FOR AN INDETERMINATE 
PERIOD OF TIME NOT TO EXCEED FIVE YEARS. THAT DOCUMENT 
SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDANT, THOUGH HE WAS SENTENCED WAS PLACED 
ON PROBATION. THE EXECUTION OF THAT SENTENCE WAS SUSPENDED 
AND HE WAS PLACED ON PROBATION FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS 
ON THE CONDITION THAT HE ENTER INTO THE NORMAL AGREEMENT 
THAT HE VIOLATE NO LAWS, THAT HE MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO 
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THE COURT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, 
AND THAT HE SERVE SIX MONTHS IN THE DUCHESNE, COUNTY JAIL. 
WE OFFER EXHIBIT NO. 1. ' 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
MR. FAMULARYl NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ONE IS RECEIVED. 
MR. DRANEYi WE FURTHER OFFER EXHIBIT NO. 2—MAY 1 
STATE, YOUR HONOR, THAT THAT IS A CERTIFIED COPY REQUIRED 
UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
WE FURTHER OFFER A MINUTE ENTRY DATED OCTOBER 27, 1980, 
AGAIN ON THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AND THIS HAS 
TWO CASE NUMBERS ON IT. 817, WHICH IS THE NUMBER OF THE 
PREVIOUS DOCUMENT, AND 944. IT INDICATES IN THERE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS TO BE SENTENCED ON THE TWO CHARGES. THE 
PREVIOUS ONE, 817, AND THE NEW ONE OCCURRING IN 1980, 944, 
AND THAT PROVIDES THAT IN CASE NO. 944 THE DEFENDANT BE 
CONFINED IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON FOR A TERM NOT LESS THAU 
ONE NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS, AND IN CASE NO. 815 THE 
SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE JUDGE IN 1977—IN 817 BE EXECUTED. 
THAT IS, CONFINEMENT IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON FOR A TERM NOT 
TO EXCEED FIVE YEARS. THE TWO SENTENCES WOULD RUN 
CONCURRENTLY. THE DEFENDANT WAS REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY OF 
THE SHERIFF OF DUCHESNE COUNTY FOR DELIVERY TO THE WARDEN 0> 
THE STATE PRISON, AND THAT ORDER OF THAT COURT WAS CARRIED 
OUT. 
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WE OFFER THOSE INTO EVIDENCE. 
THE COURTt ANY OBJECTION TO NO. 2? ' 
MR. FAMULARYJ NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURTI TWO IS RECEIVED. 
MR. DRANEYt THE STATE RESTS. 
MR. FAMULARYJ YOUR HONOR, I DON'T HAVE ANY 
WITNESSES AT THIS TIME. WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ARGUMENT. 
THE COURTt MR. DRANEY, ANY CLOSING? 
MR. DRANEYt NO. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY WAY 
GENERALLY THESE ARE GOING TO BE PROVEN IS THE ORDERS OF THE 
COURT, AND THOSE ORDERS WERE CARRIED OUT AND THAT'S WHAT IS 
BEFORE THE COURT, AND WE WILL SUBMIT IT ON THAT BASIS. 
THE COURTt MR. FAMULARY? : 
MR. FAMULARYt BASED ON THE EVIDENCE YOU WILL FiAVF 
BEFORE YOU YOU HAVE GOT A CASE NO. 817 DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 
1977. EARLIER MR. HACKFORD TESTIFIED--YOU WERE TWENTY-FIV?J 
YEARS OLD. AT THE TIME THE FIRST OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED MR. 
HACKFORD WAS A MINOR, ON THE 817 CASE. THAT SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED. : 
THE COURTt IT SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED THAT HE 
HAD BEEN CERTIFIED TO STAND TRIAL AS AN ADULT IN THIS CASE, 
AND THIS IS AN ADULT COURT AND THAT IS AN ADULT CONVICTION, 
EVEN THOUGH HE MAY HAVE BEEN UNDER EIGHTEEN. 
MR. FAMULARYt THAT'S TRUE; BUT THAT'S NOT IN THE 
ORDINARY, EITHER. 
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1 THE COURTI BUT THE JURY SHOULD BE AWARE OF THAT. 
2 YOU ARE NOT ALLEGING THIS IS A JUVENILE MATTER, BECAUSE IT 
3 W A S N O T . ••«' ,».:f 
4 MR. FAMULARY: ALLEGING THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS A 
5 JUVENILE AT THE TIME. THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED, AND FURTHER-1 
6 MORE THE PROBATION—THIS IS NOT CLEAR IN THE EVIDENCE THAT 
7 THE PROSECUTION HAS DELIVERED—WELL, HAS DELIVERED TO THE 
8 JUDGE FOR YOU, PROBATIONARY PERIOD OF THREE YEARS STARTING 
9 SEPTEMBER 14, 1977, AND THE FIRST COMMITMENT WAS BASED ON A 
10 PROBATIONARY PERIOD OF THREE YEARS. SECOND ONE WAS PAST THE 
11 THREE-YEAR POINT. STRICTLY ON WHAT YOU WILL HAVE IN FRONT 
12 OF YOU. THE SECOND ONE WAS OCTOBER 27, 1980, AT WHICH TIME 
13 IT APPEARS THAT MR. HACKFORD WAS ALREADY OFF PROBATION, 
14 BASED ON WHAT YOU HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU. AGAIN BASED ON WHAT 
15 YOU HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU THtS PRISON SENTENCE—THIS IS THE 
16 SECOND TIME, BUT THERE IS NO—CAN BE INFERRED IF THE 
17 SENTENCE THERE WAS A FELONY COMMITTED, BUT IT DOESN'T REALLY 
18 CERTIFY THAT HERE IN THE EVIDENCE THAT YOU WILL. HAVE IN 
19 FRONT OF YOU. ALL IT SAYS IS THAT THERE WAS A PRISON—NOT A 
20 PRISON SENTENCE INVOLVED. I THINK THE JUDGE WILL TELL YOU 
21 ABOUT THAT. YOU HAVE GOT TO DECIDE ON THE FACTS WHETHER OR 
22 NOT THERE WERE TWO FELONIES INVOLVED, AND ALSO WHETHER MR. 
23 HACKFORD HERE SHOULD BE CERTIFIED—SHOULD BE SENT TO—GIVEN 
24 AN AGGRAVATED SENTENCE AS HABITUAL CRIMINAL. HERE AGAIN WH 
25 WANT TO INVOKE THE PROVISIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF THE 
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7 
CONSTITUTION AND PROTECTS—THE ONLY PROTECTION MR. HACKFORD 
2 II HAS I S THIS JURY. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES YOU AS A BUFFER 
3 BETWEEN THE GRASP OF THE STATE AND THIS INDIVIDUAL, AND 
4 CERTAINLY THE JUDGE WILL GIVE YOU INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT THE 
5 ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME ARE. BUT YOU HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER 
6 || OR NOT THE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN MET AND WHETHER OR NOT MR. 
HACKFORD SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF THIS ADDITIONAL CRIME. 
8 || THANK YOU. 
9 THE COURT: ANY RESPONSE, MR. DRANEY? 
10 MR. DRANEYJ JUST THIS. THAT THE JUDGE WILL 
11 ADVISE YOU THAT I T ' S NECESSARY THAT THE DEFENDANT BE 
12 CONVICTED, THAT HE BE SENTENCED, AND THAT HE BE COMMITTED, 
13 AND THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THOSE IS A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
H IN CRIMINAL NO. 9 4 4 , UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATE LAW, 
,5 THE PENALTY FOR A SECOND DEGREE FELONY IS ONE TO FIFTEEN 
) 6 YEARS, AND YOU WILL SEE IN THE RECORDS THAT YOU WILL HAVE 
17 THAT THAT WAS THE SENTENCE IN 9 4 4 , THAT THE PENALTY FOR A 
18 THIRD DEGREE FELONY I S ZERO TO FIVE YEARS, AND THAT WAS THE 
,9 SENTENCE IN NO. 8 1 7 . 
II v 
20 THE FINAL ELEMENTS THAT YOU WILL BE INSTRUCTED ON IS 
2i THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS—WE HAVE TO SHOW THE DEFENDANT HAS 
22 NOW BEEN CONVICTED OF A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND YOU LADIES 
23 . AND GENTLEMEN HAVE FOUND HIM GUILTY OF TWO SECOND DEGREE 
24 FELONIES TODAY. ALL ELEMENTS ARE HERE. THAT IS WHAT IS 
25 REQUIRED UNDER THE STATUTE, AND BASED ON THAT WE BELIEVE 
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1 THAT WE HAVE MET OUR BURDEN. 
2 THE COURTl THANK YOU. 
II 
3 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE EVIDENCE CONSISTS OF THESE | 
I 
4 TWO DOCUMENTS, AND THAT'S ALL THERE IS. I WILL TELL YOU \ 
II ' 
5 THAT THESE DOCUMENTS ARE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE COURT. 
6 THEY SAY WHAT THEY SAY, AND COUNSEL CANNOT COME IN AND SAY 
7 THAT YOU SHOULD LOOK AT THEM AND SEE IF THEY SAY ANYTHING, 
8 BECAUSE THEY SAY WHAT THEY DO. THEY SAY IT VERY CLEARLY, 
9 THAT HE WAS CONVICTED IN 817 AND HE WAS CONVICTED IN 944, 
10 SENTENCED AND COMMITTED IN BOTH OF THESE. THE COURT HAS 
H ALREADY RULED ON THAT BASIS ON THAT THING, AND THAT'S WHAT 
12 HAPPENED. '••"'' ! 
13 •' NOW, WE HAVE A VERY FEW INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE. THEY 
14 ARE VERY SHORT, BUT THERE AGAIN YOU WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO GC 
15 BACK IN THE JURY ROOM AND LOOK AT THEM. AGAIN, ALL THE 
16 INSTRUCTIONS THAT I READ TO YOU BEFORE WILL APPLY. THE 
17 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IS THERE. THE REASONABLE DOUBT 
18 INSTRUCTION IS THERE. ALL OF THOSE STILL APPLY IN THIS 
19 CASE, BECAUSE IT IS A CRIMINAL MATTER. ALL I'M BASICALLY 
20 GOING TO GIVE TO YOU IS THE TWO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS AS 
21 THEY APPLY TO THIS PARTICULAR CASE. YOU ALSO WILL NEED TO 
22 EITHER KEEP YOUR FOREMAN OR GET A NEW ONE AND DO THE SAME 
23 THEN. LET ME READ THESE TO YOU AT THIS TIME. 
24 INSTRUCTION NO. 1: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMF 
25 OF BEING A HABITUAL CRIMINAL ARE AS FOLLOWS t 
-]'M 
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(1) THAT THE DEFENDANT PATRICK J. HACKFORD (2) HAS BEEN 
TWICE SENTENCED, AND COMMITTED FOR FELONY OFFENSES, AND (3) 
ONE OF THE PRIOR OFFENSES WAS AT LEAST A FELONY OF THE 
SECOND DEGREE, AND (4) THE DEFENDANT HAS NOW BEEN CONVICTED 
OF A SECOND DEGREE FELONY IN THIS STATE. 
IF THE STATE HAS PROVED TO YOUR SATISFACTION BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT ALL THE ABOVE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE 
CRIME CHARGED YOU SHOULD FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY. IF THE 
STATE HAS FAILED TO PROVE TO YOUR SATISFACTION BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT EACH OF THE ABOVE ELEMENTS THEN YOU SHOULD 
» FIND THE DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY. . 
/
 NO. 2J YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT THE WORD "COMMITTED" 
MEANS THE ORDER BY WHICH A PERSON IS SENT TO PRISON. YOU 
ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTED THAT EACH TIME A PERSON IS ORDERED 
SENT TO PRISON IN CARRYING OUT A SENTENCE, THAT PERSON IS 
BEING COMMITTED. IT IS IRRELEVANT WHETHER MULTIPLE 
COMMITMENTS ARE TO BE SERVED CONCURRENTLY, THAT IS, AT THE 
SAME TIME, OR CONSECUTIVELY, THAT IS SEPARATELY. j 
AS I HAVE INDICATED TO YOU, THE OTHER INSTRUCTIONS DO 
APPLY. , . >..*-
WE HAVE TWO VERDICT FORMS ATTACHED TO THESE. THE 
VERDICT FORMS ARE EXACTLY WHAT YOU HAVE SEEN BEFORE. 
WE, THE JURY IMPANELED IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE, 
FIND THE DEFENDANT PATRICK J. HACKFORD, GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY 
AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. THAT'S ALL THE CASE IS. 
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1 ISN'T A GREAT BIG CASE. IT'S AN IMPORTANT CASE TO MR. 
2 HACKFORD. IT'S A CASE BASED PURELY UPON THESE DOCUMENTS, 
3 AND I URGE YOU TO TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT THE DOCUMENTS AND AT 
4 THE INSTRUCTIONS. / :U 
5 DEPUTY LEFFLER; YOU BETTER SWEAR HIM AGAIN. IT'S A 
6 NEW CASE. ' ' 
7 (WHEREUPON THE BAILIFF WAS SWORN BY THE CLFRF 
8 AFTER WHICH THE JURY WAS EXCUSED AT 8:35 
9 • : P.M. ) •' ""''•' P 
10 THE COURTl THE RECORD WILL INDICATE THE JURY HAS 
11 LEFT. DO YOU HAVE ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THE INSTRUCTIONS? YOU 
12 MAY TAKE THEM TO THE REPORTER AT THIS TIME. HERE IS A COPY 
13 OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.' : ' ''• 
14 ' ' MR. F A M U L A R Y J THIS IS ANTHONY FAMULARYr ATTORNEY 
15 FOR DEFENDANT PATRICK HACKFORD. IN THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
16 CASE, NO. 85-CR-26, I TAKE THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
17 INSTRUCTIONS t 
18 FIRST, THE INSTRUCTIONS DIDN'T CONTAIN A DEFINITION OF 
19 THE WORD COMMITMENT. WELL, IT DID—THAT THE EXCEPTION IS 
20 THAT THE GIVEN DEFINITION OF THE WORD COMMITMENT DOESN'T 
21 TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT THE FIRST COMMITMENT 
22 IN THE 817 CASE WAS SUSPENDED, AND THAT NO SEPARATE TIME WAT 
23 SERVED BASED ON THAT FIRST COMMITMENT. BUT THAT THE 
24 SENTENCE WAS MERGED INTO THE SECOND COMMITMENT, IN THE 944 
25 CASE. . r' ! 
-193-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SECONDLY, THERE WAS NO PROVISION TO LET THE JURORS KNOW 
2 IK THAT IT WAS A FIRST DEGREE FELONY AND IT CARRIED WITH IT A 
H 
3/II FIVE TO LIFE PENALTY. THE COURT'S FAILURE TO DO SO DID NOT 
LET THE JURY BE APPRISED OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE, 
(WHEREUPON THE JURY RETURNS AT 8:55 P.M.) 
THE COURT: BACK ON THE RECORD.- THE RECORD SHOULD 
INDICATE THE JURY IS BACK, COUNSEL AND THE DEFENDANT ARE ALT, 
PRESENT. 
THANK YOU, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. I ASSUME THAT YOU 
HAVE REACHED A VERDICT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. FOREMAN: YES. 
THE COURT: I AM PLEASED TO TELL YOU YOUR SERVICED 
ARE ALMOST FINISHED. WE DON'T HAVE ANY MORE SURPRISES FOR 
YOU. 
THE COURT HAS BEEN HANDED A COPY OF THE VERDICT. I'LL 
ASK THE CLERK TO READ THAT. 
THE CLERK: STATE OF UTAH V. PATRICK J. HACKFORD, 
VERDICT 85-CR-26D. 
WE THE JURY IMPANELED IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE FIND 
THE DEFENDANT, PATRICK J. HACKFORD, GUILTY AS CHARGED IN TUT 
INFORMATION. DATED MARCH 20, 1985. PAUL E. RASMUSSEN, 
FOREMAN. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. IS THIS YOUR VERDICT? 
MRS. ROBBINS: YES. 
MR. RASMUSSEN: YES. 
-191-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Dave B. Thompson, 
Assistant Attorney General, State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this oi J day of September, 1985. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
